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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article starts from the premise that the primary goal of any
competent parental leave legislation should be to enable both mothers and
fathers to maintain equal career choices without sacrificing a meaningful
family life. To this point, leave legislation proposals have not worked hard
enough to make this goal a reality. Faced with a great gender imbalance
between parents who take leave and those who do not, proposals have often
contemplated ways to improve the ratio between male and female leavetakers. Such proposals, however, have rarely considered gender imbalance
to be the primary obstacle to a successful leave regime. Thus, they have
failed to pay adequate attention to the root of the problem.
This article argues that eliminating, not merely improving or
containing, the gender imbalance in leave-taking is the key to maximizing
the potential of leave legislation to achieve not only the previously stated
goal, but to work more broadly toward complete gender equality in the
workplace. To eliminate the gender imbalance, we must make paternal
leave-taking not merely a suitable or attractive option, but rather an
undeniable one. We must create powerful incentives that overcome
trenchant gender norms that strongly encourage a traditional work/family
gender split; this may be accomplished by appealing not to men's
consciences or family values, but rather to their pocketbooks. In short, we
must pay men to take paternity leave.
This article proposes leave legislation that compensates both maternal
and paternal leave-takers at rates above and beyond their regular salaries.
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Such a proactive approach to legislation represents a realization that in
order to achieve actual gender equalization in leave-taking or elsewhere in
the workplace, we must actively seek to change gender norms, instead of
simply seeking to change the ratios, biases, and protocols that exist within
them. It is the obstinate refusal to look at and affect the bigger picture that
makes past leave legislation proposals so fundamentally flawed. While
better than the unpaid leave of 1993's Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) l , proposals that contemplate partial or even full wage replacement
during leave only serve to make leave-taking a less unattractive option for
both men and women. These proposals make leave a possibility, although
not necessarily a viable one. However, partial- or full-wage proposals do
not affect the odds that men will either want or subsequently take
advantage of the possibility to take leave. Under such proposals the
minority of men who would like to take leave have less of a disincentive to
take it (for disincentives, economic and otherwise, still exist). However,
such proposals create no impetus to take leave for the majority of men. It
logically follows that male leave-takers will remain a minority among
fathers, and that therefore replacement proposals will never make more
than small inroads into the leave-taking gender ratio.
Mandatory leave-taking proposals, which contemplate forced paternity
leave, more directly attack the gender ratio. However, they fail to make
leave more desirable among men, so despite a superficial and most likely
short-lived change in numbers, underlying gender biases will remain and
may even worsen, thus leaving gender norms undisturbed.2
In contrast to wage replacement and mandatory leave proposals, a
compensatory leave regime has the potential to dramatically alter the
desirability, and hence the long-term success, of paternity leave.
Equalizing the gender divide in parental leave-taking is not only
valuable in and of itself, but it wields tremendous power in combating
workplace inequality generally. The traditional association of women with
motherhood has historically contributed to women's inability to attain
equal power in the job market.3 From this disadvantaged starting position,
the interference of maternity breaks in a woman's career can make it
difficult to build and retain human capital, further distancing women from
their unencumbered male counterparts .
Once out of the workforce,
1. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).
2. Any change will likely be short-lived not only because the effectiveness of a
mandatory rule in an unsympathetic and unprepared environment is questionable, but also
because the legislation itself will likely be short-lived due to its failure to affect gender
biases. See infra Section II.A.2.
3. See SHEILA B. KAMERMAN ET AL., MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 1-27
(1983) (providing an evidentiary background and historical accounts of inequality of power
in the job market).
4.

See FRANCINE D. BLAU & MARIANNE A. FERBER, THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN,
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women become increasingly less likely to resume working. The gauge for
measuring this phenomenon is known as "attachment" to the workforce. 5
As Professor Martin Malin succinctly notes, "as long as parental leave
remains de facto maternal leave, work-family conflicts will remain a
significant barrier to women's employment and a significant source of
discrimination against women." 6
Outside of the immediate economic effects, the use of both maternal
and paternal leave presents a number of benefits. If men become as likely
as women to take parental leave, it will result in a greater equalization of
bargaining power in the job market, as well as an equalization of the
disadvantages parents face in building their careers. Furthermore, a
successful parental leave policy can have the positive impact of reducing
risks to human capital, workforce attachment, and other factors that leavetaking jeopardizes. If men participate equally in parental leave they will
share its disadvantages equally. Additionally, a leave policy that advances
gender equality in leave-taking will help to eviscerate those disadvantages.
There is also evidence indicating that early bonding with an infant and the
early development of parenting skills are directly linked to the future
division of labor between parents, suggesting that the successful promotion
of paternity leave will likely reap benefits even beyond its scope.' A more
equal division of parental labor throughout childhood can only aid in the
pursuit of gender equalization in the workplace.
Part II of this article will explain why a leave regime that compensates
parents in addition to providing full wage replacement is most favorable.
Additionally, it will discuss what such a regime might look like, as well as
some issues that it might engender. Part III will offer an economic defense
of the proposal, as well as discuss potential funding mechanisms.

152-81, 184-85 (1987) (observing that the starting point for women employees,
while improving, generally remains lower in pay and position).
5. See Gillian Lester, A Defense of PaidFamily Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 38
(2005) (indicating a decrease of attachment due to maternity leave); Michael Selmi, Family
Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 730-736 (2000) (regarding women's
lessened attachment to the labor force after maternity leave).
6. Martin H. Malin, Fathersand ParentalLeave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1052 (1994)
[hereinafter Malin, Fathers].
7. See generally KATHRYN C. BACKETT, MOTHERS AND FATHERS (1982) (examining
the development of parental behavior). See also Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental
Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25, 36-37 (1998) [hereinafter Malin, Leave Revisited]
(correlating paternal leave with future parental involvement); Malin, Fathers,supra note 6,
at 1055-1057 (suggesting early maternal involvement leads to later paternal exclusion).
AND WORK
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II.

EMPLOYEE INCENTIVIZING: A COMPENSATION PLAN FOR PARENTAL
LEAVE

A.

ExplainingAway the Alternatives: The Inadequaciesof Unpaid Leave,
Leave Mandates, and Simple Wage Replacement

As established in Part I, in order to effectuate change in patterns of
leave-taking over the long-term, leave legislation must do more than simply
make it possible for men to take leave, absent extra incentives. 8 Thirteen
years of history under the FMLA evidence the ineffectiveness of an unpaid
leave regime in significantly altering preexisting leave behavior among
males. Logistically, the easiest solution would be to statutorily mandate
leave for men, thus eliminating the need for incentives. Though mandates
may have a role to play, overly aggressive mandates, or an over-reliance on
them, are not only more unrealistic and potentially problematic than an
incentive-based system, but may also prove more costly over time. Finally,
while a wage replacement regime would do more than an unpaid regime to
encourage men to take leave, the incentive provided by such a regime is
insufficient to provide any real or lasting parity between maternal and
paternal leave-taking. This section posits that the only effective solution to
the gender leave gap is to implement a compensation plan for taking
parental leave that pays a significant sum on top of full wage replacement.
1.

The Family and Medical Leave Act

Though the FMLA has arguably made a positive impact in some
areas,9 it has clearly failed to significantly increase the number of men who
take leave, even if they are eligible.'0 The language of the FMLA is gender
neutral, so at first glance it appears to take a step in the direction of gender
parity by shifting the statutory focus from maternity to parental leave. 1
8. See Selmi, supra note 5, at 759 (suggesting that the FMLA is unlikely to alter
gender roles because it fails to create incentives for men to take leave).
9. See STEVEN K. WISENSALE, FAMILY LEAVE POLICY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

WORK AND FAMILY INAMERICA 158, 163 (2001) (noting tangible turnover reduction, a slight
overall employment gain, no negative (but no positive) effect on women's wages, slightly
increased utilization rates, and a negligible economic burden for employers).
10. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS:

FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000 UPDATE 4-15 (2000) (indicating that fewer than

half as many men take leave under the FMLA as compared to similarly situated women).
See also Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security Without Equality: The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17, 54-55 (2004) (positing that the figures
regarding paternal leave are often misleading, as paternal leave is often of shorter duration
than maternal leave).
11. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994) (using the term "parents" instead of gender
specific nomenclature).
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However, because leave is unpaid, and women generally command lower
wages than men, it is still much more likely that women will take leave in a
two-parent family in order to lessen the financial loss. 2 Perhaps more
importantly, the FMLA, because it is unpaid and thus an unattractive option
taken only if absolutely necessary, perpetuates existing cultural norms that
simultaneously promote maternity leave and discourage paternity leave. 3
In addition to economic considerations, cultural norms that oppose
paternity leave find expression in workplace hostility, social pressure, and
individual male reticence to leave-taking.' 4 The combination of these
pressures often renders paternity leave de facto unavailable, even if men
possess a legal right to take leave.
The perpetuation of these leave-taking norms reinforces the American
model of the ideal worker as anyone but a woman of child-bearing age; if
maternity leave is a cultural reality but paternity leave is not, women
become much less attractive as potential employees.' 5 Some scholars even
argue that an act targeted exclusively to women could have done more to
promote gender equality in the workplace than the FMLA in its present
form. This is because such an act could have included more economically
vulnerable women among its protected beneficiaries to the exclusion of
only "a few relatively privileged men.' 6 If the FMLA fails to change
cultural norms with respect to paternity leave, an alternative would be to
focus on creating and protecting better maternity leave options. However,
changing paternity leave norms is a particularly efficient means of arriving
at workplace gender equality.' 7 Therefore, while a maternity-focused leave
policy might do more for women's welfare than the FMLA, leave
12. See, e.g., Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The
Public Values andMoral Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 77, 116 (2000) (noting that women are more likely to take leave because of

their relative position in the workplace); Grossman, supra note 10, at 38 ("[T]here exists a
clear incentive for a couple to prefer maternal leave over paternal leave ... .
13. Bornstein, supra note 12; Grossman, supra note 10.
14. Bornstein, supra note 12; Grossman, supra note 10. See Malin, Leave Revisited,
supra note 7, at 39-42 (discussing workplace hostility toward accommodating family
responsibilities); Joseph H. Pleck, Fathersand Infant CareLeave, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE
CRISIS: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY 177, 185-187 (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds.,

1988) [hereinafter Pleck, Fathers] (affecting paternal leave decisions are "the length and
timing of leave, whether and how the leave is paid, and employer attitudes toward male
employees who take these leaves."); Selmi, supra note 5, at 757-759 ("[M]en... fear they
will suffer workplace repercussions from their employers [for taking paternal leave].").
15. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 64-113 (2000) (discussing the perception that an ideal employee

works full time, or more, if necessary-a role few women are able to fill because of the
unwillingness of their spouses to stay home and raise their children).
16. Bornstein, supra note 12, at 115 (citing Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make
Sense to Talk About "Women "?, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 33 (1991)).
17. See supra Part I.
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legislation that attempts to change existing gender norms is still preferable.
Unpaid leave, as articulated under the FMLA, is unambiguously inadequate
even as a temporary resolution, and it is far from norm-changing.18
2.

Mandatory Leave-Taking

In light of the policy goal of equalized leave-taking, it would seem
logical to initiate a system that makes leave-taking mandatory if we cannot
expect men to take advantage of leave voluntarily. Although it could
instantaneously and drastically increase the number of men who will take
leave, instigating such a system has obvious drawbacks. First, even if the
leave were unpaid and therefore arguably less costly to employers, a
proposal mandating leave would likely be met with staunch, and perhaps
insurmountable, political opposition. 9 The unpopularity of this proposal is
evidenced by its notable absence from the scholarly discussion about
proper leave policy. One rare reference is the negative response that the
proposed FMLA sometimes encountered prior to its enactment when men
confused an employer's mandatory obligation to provide paternity leave
with making leave-taking mandatory for an employee, the latter of which
the FMLA never contemplated.2 °
This negative response merely
foreshadows the political response that would occur if mandatory leave
were actually under consideration.
In a political climate that emphasizes economic and personal freedom
from obligations, it will be difficult to pass a proposal that contemplates
any sort of government interference with the free market (which any leave
legislation would necessitate), let alone inhibits the freedom of
employment of a significant number of individuals. Professor Michael
Selmi is one of the only commentators who has seriously contemplated
making leave-taking mandatory. 2' Though he notes the possible benefits of
such a proposal, Selmi questions its administrability; he is particularly
concerned with what set of fathers and/or male caretakers such a proposal
would apply to, and consequently, the proposal's ability to garner sufficient

18. See Grossman, supra note 10, at 61 (noting that in order to change gender norms
through leave policy, "[m]en must be affirmatively pressed into service. At a minimum, the
law should make paternity leave more enticing.").
19. See Selmi, supra note 5, at 774-75 (illustrating and presenting reasons why
legislation espousing mandatory paternity leave is unlikely to receive sufficient political
support).
20. See Pleck, Fathers supra note 14, at 188 ("[Mien often mistakenly think the ...
technical term mandatedparentalleave (that is, employers are mandated to offer it) actually
means that fathers would be required to take it[.]") (emphasis in original).
21. See Selmi, supra note 5, at 773-775 (discussing both the benefits of, and possible
objections to, mandatory paternal leave).
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support.22 Professor Selmi's qualms are understandable but greatly underinclusive; such a proposal would probably face fundamental and substantial
opposition, extending beyond mere doubts about its administrability.
A second consideration involves the questionable constitutionality of a
mandatory leave-taking obligation. A statute only mandating paternity
leave might be susceptible to a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 Indeed, a statute that applied equally to
men and women would more easily pass constitutional muster.24 But even
a statute that mandates coequal but sequential leave for both mothers and
fathers may face opposition as a restriction based on gender.25 Meanwhile,
a statute mandating that both parents take leave simultaneously might come
at too significant a cost to employers, resulting in employment
Indirectly promoting
discrimination based on familial status.26
discrimination is less defensible under a mandatory system where parents
must take leave when they may, depending on whether leave is paid or
unpaid, have no independent incentives to take leave. Discrimination
under a voluntary, incentive-laden regime, though still problematic, would
at least be somewhat less offensive as a statutory side-effect since parents
would have the opportunity to weigh incentives and disincentives before

22. Id. at 775.
23. The Supreme Court affords intermediate scrutiny to claims of Equal Protection
violations based on gender. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 595 (1996)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to find that denying women admittance into the Virginia
Military Institute is unconstitutional). Consequently, legislators would have to show an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" in order to classify based on gender. Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455,
461 (1981) and Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
Though one might argue that mandatory leave is justified as the only reasonable means of
achieving gender-equalized leave-taking, see Selmi, supra note 5, at 774 n.246 (outlining an
argument for the constitutionality of mandatory paternity leave), the likely availability of
gender-neutral avenues to arrive at gender equality makes this argument somewhat dubious
and unconvincing. See infra Section II.B.
24. A gender-neutral statute need only survive rational basis review for Equal
Protection claims to pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) ("[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.").
It would be relatively easy to demonstrate that a statute employed rational means to arrive at
"the important goal of reducing gender inequality." Selmi, supra note 5, at 774 n.247.
25. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 732 (2003) (indicating that
if the FMLA, gender-neutral on its face, operated to reinforce traditional gender roles by, for
example, not setting a minimum amount of leave, thereby excluding women who would
need leave to be guaranteed for a substantial period, that it might be unconstitutional).
26. Discrimination based on familial status is also a significant threat under a
compensatory leave proposal. But, as the next paragraph argues, the costs, and the
accompanying risk of discrimination, might actually be greater under a mandatory leave
system.
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opting to take leave.
Even among feminists, mandatory leave-taking may be an unpopular
solution to workplace gender inequality in any incarnation, and particularly
if it involves women. Maternity leave has been compulsory in the past and
historically served as an obstacle to women's employment and
consequently women's empowerment.27 Mandatory leave is therefore often
associated with paternalism and the subjugation of women, and therefore
may be equally distasteful across a wide political spectrum. 2' Though a
mandatory system might work to change cultural norms by force, it would
be met with more resistance than a system that incentivized norm-changing
behavior. In addition, it might take longer to take positive effect, assuming
a mandatory system would take positive effect at all. It is more realistic to
foresee a backlash against both female employment and female
advancement, despite statutorily imposed equalized leave-taking, due to the
bitterness engendered by any statute that requires action at odds with longstanding, definitive norms.
Finally, though the chief appeal of compulsory leave over incentivized
leave is cost savings, a compulsory approach would arguably cost more
than an incentivized approach in the long run. Without any corresponding
wage replacement, some of the economic benefits that leave-taking
otherwise creates for parents would be missing. 29 Even if accompanied by
partial or complete wage replacement, natural resistance to compulsory
initiatives might negatively impact worker efficiency and productivity. ° In
any event, this would lessen the initial cost-gap between a compulsory and
an incentivized leave system. A compulsory system would also include
enforcement costs, though it is unclear how significantly these would differ
from monitoring costs in an incentivized leave system.3
27. See Meryl Frank & Robyn Lipner, History of Maternity Leave in Europe and the
United States, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRIsIs: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY, supra note 14,
at 3-22 (tracing the history of protective leave for mothers in the United States and in other
countries). See also KAMERMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 29-46 (discussing the history of
maternity policies in the United States).
28. See, e.g., KAMERMAN ET AL., supra note 3; Beth Willinger, Resistance and Change:
College Men 's Attitudes Toward Family and Work in the 1980s, in MEN, WORK, AND
FAMILY 108, 110-112 (Jane C. Hood ed., 1993) (offering a variety of perspectives to
facilitate the understanding of male resistance to changing gender roles) (citing Janet G.
Hunt & Larry L. Hunt, Male Resistance to Role Symmetry in Dual-Earner Households:
Three Alternative Explanations, in FAMILIES AND WORK 192, 192-203 (Naomi Gerstel &
Harriet Engel Gross eds., 1987)).
29. See infra Section III.B.
30. Mandatory leave might also create significant backlash among male employees and
employers, thereby heightening the risks of noncompliance and possibly providing an
impetus for increased discrimination against women. Indeed, a similar sort of backlash has
been observed in Sweden. See infra Section II.A.3, at note 55.
31. The bulk of monitoring under incentivized leave would consist of minimizing
employer abuse of leave-takers (i.e., having employees on "leave" in name only and
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Despite the substantial impediments to, and potential negative impacts
of, a mandatory leave regime, it would be imprudent to universally dismiss
advocating for any sort of mandatory leave. A very short period of genderneutral mandatory leave might engender less opposition, and hence, less
potential backlash. Mandatory parental leave for a one or two week period
could even be marketed as an emotional health benefit to the newborn,
rather than as a politically charged attempt to equalize gender relations
domestically and in the workplace. The value of even a brief leave taken
universally should not be under-emphasized or dismissed; not only would it
encourage early parent-child bonding, 2 but it could serve as an important
tool in changing parental norms over time. Once men have become
accustomed to newborn leave-taking that has been statutorily imposed, it
will be a less foreboding step, especially when combined with an incentive
scheme, to take voluntary leave. A survey of foreign leave policy, notably
Japan's, whose cultural gender-divide is arguably much more severe than
in the United States,33 reveals some consideration of attempts to normalize
paternal leave-taking by mandating short leave periods.34
In conclusion, though mandatory leave cannot be seen as the primary
solution to increasing male leave-taking, and should be carefully
constructed keeping in mind potential costs and difficulties, a short
mandatory leave period can augment an incentive-driven leave program
and should be considered seriously.
3.

Full or Partial Wage Replacement

A form of paid leave that would amount to either full or partial wage
replacement is the most oft-supported alternative among critics of the
FMLA's unfunded leave. Some degree of wage replacement is advocated
by national groups of experts,35 and both major political parties have
requiring or inferring that some amount of work be done on leave), but would also include
ensuring that only appropriate parties are taking advantage of compensatory leave.
32. See supra note 7.

33. Japan's substantial gender-divide is noteworthy because Japanese policymakers
must have concluded that brief mandatory leave would help promote paternity leave without
serious backlash of the sort discussed in this section. If Japan's mandatory leave legislation
is successful, it may indicate that similar legislation could succeed in the United States.
34. See Leo Lewis, Fathers Will Be Forced to Mind Baby, TIMES ONLINE, December 3,

2004, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1384908,00.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006)
(discussing the mandatory paternity leave implemented by the Japanese city of Ota). See
also Arielle Horman Grill, Comment, The Myth of Unpaid Family Leave: Can the United
States Implement a Paid Leave Policy Based on the Swedish Model?, 17 CoMP. LAB. L.J.

373, n.54 (1996) (noting that in Sweden each parent has thirty days of mandatory leave)
(citing Ann Numhauser-Henning, Address at the Third Japan Institute of Labor Tokyo
Seminar on Comparative Labor Law (Sept. 24, 1994)).
35. See Task Force Recommendations on ParentalLeave and Child Care in PARENTAL
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recognized that some wage replacement might be necessary to invigorate
the FMLA.36 In 1999, President Clinton called for federal regulations that
would allow states to experiment with partial wage replacement through
Temporary Disability Insurance Funds. 3" Although the proposal was later
discontinued by the Bush Administration, a number of states have
continued to experiment with partial wage replacement.3" Many scholars
note that without wage replacement at levels sufficient to help defray
income loss over the leave period, many FMLA-qualified individuals will
be unable to make use of parental leave. 39 This is certainly a sufficient
reason to advocate for some form of paid leave.
However, even if wage replacement were guaranteed to the extent
necessary to fund a parental leave, it would still serve to exacerbate the
leave-taking gender gap. Because men on average enjoy higher salaries
than women, a straight percentage cut for a family across each wage
earner's income will still usually provide an economic bias toward
maternity leave. 40 Even a system that on average equalized the economic
impact of paternity and maternity leave by adjusting the percentage of

LEAVE AND CHILD CARE: SETTING A RESEARCH AND POLICY AGENDA 463, 464 (Janet Shibley

Hyde & Marilyn J. Essex eds., 1991) (recommending 75% wage replacement up to a
maximum of 150% of the median individual income in the United States for up to 52
weeks); See also Recommendations of the Yale Bush Center Advisory Committee on Infant
CareLeave in THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS, supra note 14, at 344-345 (recommending 75%
wage replacement up to a reasonable maximum for up to 3 months).
36. WISENSALE, supra note 9, at 160.
37. See Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 65 Fed. Reg. 37, 210 (June
13, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 604) ("[Tlhe President directed the Secretary of
Labor on May 23, 1999, to propose regulations allowing unemployment fund moneys to be
used to provide partial wage replacement to mothers and fathers on leave following the birth
or adoption of a child.").
38. WISENSALE, supra note 9, at 186-187.
39. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprint for
Family Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 335, 346-347 (1993) (noting that a deficiency of wage
replacement at appropriate levels will deter qualified FMLA persons from taking paid
leave).
40. To illustrate the point: suppose a parental couple makes $180,000 in sum, with the
father earning $100,000, and the mother earning $80,000. Suppose further that wage
replacement for leave-taking is 75% of total income for a full year of leave. If the father
took leave, he would be compensated at $75,000 (75% of $100,000). The father's net loss
as a result of taking leave would therefore be $25,000 ($100,000 minus $75,000). If the
mother took leave, she would be compensated at $60,000 (75% of $80,000). The mother's
net loss as a result of taking leave would therefore be $20,000 ($80,000 minus $60,000).
Because the couple would lose less overall net income if the mother took leave, similarly
situated couples would trend toward maternity leave over paternity leave (and thus minimize
the amount of income that would be lost under the replacement wage). For further
clarification, see Jean Kimmel & Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, The Effects of Family Leave
on Wages, Employment, and the Family Wage Gap: DistributionalImplications, 15 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 115, 124-140 (2004) (discussing the economic ramifications of paid
parental leave for men and women).
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wage replacement upward for men and/or downward for women 41 would
still result in less than gender equalized leave-taking due to existing extraeconomic cultural norms that cut against paternity leave.42
Professor Selmi asserts that equalized leave-taking may be
economically beneficial for men in the long run. 43 However, he maintains
that even if men realized this, they might be unwilling to sacrifice some of
their current advantage over women in earning potential-if only bcause it
is human nature to favor power retention for an immediate short-term gain
over power erosion for a distant future benefit. 44 Thus, even creative
proposals to equalize the economic loss suffered as a result of leave-taking
within a dual-earner family may aid the reduction of-but will not
eliminate-leave-taking's unequal gender distribution. Barbara Bergman's
proposal for wage replacement as "a constant proportion of [a couple's]
usual joint income, regardless of which parent was staying home,"
illustrates one possible alternative. 45 As an alternative to a proposal
advocating compensation above full wage replacement, one might consider
a system that compensates fathers within a dual-income couple
significantly more than mothers such that the economic incentive will be
reversed, and a couple would lose less income if the father took leave.
However, it may be inequitable to pay fathers more for leave than mothers.
Indeed, this method may result in constitutional problems similar to those
posed by legislation mandating leave for men but not for women, as
discussed above.4 6
With the exception of creative thinkers like Selmi and Bergman, too
often commentators in this area observe a low rate of leave-taking among
men, as well as data that tends to suggest that even with wage replacement
male participation will remain lower than female participation, and

41. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (providing a hypothetical situation where
the economic impact of taking leave would be equalized if either the father's wage
replacement rises to 80%, resulting in a net loss of $20,000, or the mother's wage
replacement falls to 68.75%, resulting in a net loss of $25,000.).
42. See Lester, supra note 5, at 38-41, 59 (citing firm-specific human capital and
retention of seniority, as well as "a variety of cultural factors," as additional factors which
employees consider in making their decisions regarding paid or unpaid leave.).
43. See supra Section III.B.
44. Selmi, supra note 5, at 757.
45. Barbara R. Bergman, Work-Family Policies and Equality Between Women and
Men, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 279 (Francine D. Blau & Ronald
G. Ehrenberg eds., 1997). Bergman's proposal has the advantage over an equalization
proposal consistent with note 40 in that equalization would be non-gender-discriminatory
and thus would encounter less legal difficulty.
46. See cases cited supra notes 23-25 (listing United States Supreme Court decisions
suggesting that there are constitutional problems with mandating paid leave for one gender
exclusively and outlining the Court's approach to restrictions based on gender more
generally).
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conclude that men should be incorporated into leave policymaking as
slowly and as moderately as possible. 47 This thinking is backwards. Rather
than accept low rates of participation as constants from which we should
develop sound and conservative policy, we should approach them as
variables that can increase if such increases are targeted as policy goals.
Professor Joseph Pleck, who subscribes to this faulty position, finds
data to §upport slow increases of wage replacement percentages as the best
means of encouraging paternity leave in Sweden's slow, deliberate
increases in paternity leave and the corresponding increases in leave
participation among Swedish men.48 Nowhere in these statistical analyses
does Professor Pleck consider or address leave policy's potential for
normative change.49 Moderate success, however (which fails to approach
equalization, and which, after years of governmental promotion, still masks
significant employment difficulties for women),5 ° should not be taken as an
argument against attempts at more radical change. Unfortunately, the
underlying attitude of this sort of perspective is that there is no real
problem with women taking parental leave much more frequently than
men: "fathers will not necessarily use [parental leave] to an equal degree or
in the same way [as mothers]. This should not be viewed as a failure of the

47. See, e.g., Pleck, Fatherssupra note 14, at 188-189 ("There is a tendency in the U.S.
to assume that paternity leave is a six-month leave taken by the father when a child is born.
. However, the actual duration and timing of Swedish paternity leave in practice (relatively
short leave-terms, not only at birth) would be a better model for the United States than the
six-month theoreticalentitlement." (emphasis added)).
48. Id. at 181-184 (discussing Sweden's experimentation with paternity leave policy
and resulting statistics, concluding that "[f]lexibility in how long and when to take paternity
leave seems essential for significant numbers [of men] to make use of them." Professor
Pleck's conclusion implies that policyrnakers should not be overly ambitious or demanding
in encouraging men to take leave). See also Joseph H. Pleck, Are "Family-Supportive"
Employer Policies Relevant to Men?, in MEN, WORK, AND FAMILY, supra note 28, at 217,
227-228, 230-234 [hereinafter Pleck, Employer Policies] (concluding that "[t]wo principles

appear to influence the extent to which men use particular family-supportive policies. Men
use policies to the extent that their use (a) does not reduce their earnings, weakening their
role and identity as breadwinners, and (b) does not cause them to be perceived as
uncommitted to their jobs or unmasculine. Particular policies will be used most if their
'cost' on these two dimensions are low and will be used far less if their cost is higher on
either." This conclusion again supports the inference that leave should be carefully
constructed so as not to offend men's perceived and actual normative role.).
49. See generally Pleck, Fathers supra note 14; Pleck, Employer Policies supra note
48.
50. See LINDA HAAS, EQUAL PARENTHOOD AND SOCIAL POLICY: A STUDY OF PARENTAL
LEAVE IN SWEDEN 166-177 (1992) [hereinafter HAAS, PARENTHOOD] (asserting that there

remain significant employment hurdles for women, despite governmental espousal of equal
opportunities for all who seek jobs); Malin, Fatherssupra note 6, at 1063 (noting continued
rampant discrimination against women by employers in Sweden and the United States and
that "[employers'] greatest incentive for discrimination will be in hiring decisions.").

20071

AGGRESSIVE PARENTAL LEAVE INCENTIVIZING

policies or of fathers," Pleck writes." Rather than attempting to change
gender norms, Pleck merely seeks to increase paternity leave moderately
within existing norms. Though moderate change may be more realistic in
the short-term, it will never succeed in achieving actual gender equality in
the workplace, which requires widespread norm-changing.52 As such,
moderate leave policy will never reach the full potential of leave legislation
to effect social and economic betterment in the United States and should
therefore be rejected.
Sweden presents a good example of a wage replacement system in
action. 3 While, as Pleck notes, progress has been significant, the Swedish
model still demonstrates exactly how and why a wage replacement system
is an inadequate vehicle through which to pursue gender equality in the
workplace.54 Though created with the express goal of promoting gender
equality in both work and family life, and though almost half of eligible
men took some amount of parental leave as of 1992" (far more than current
participation among eligible fathers in the United States),56 women still
51. Pleck, Fathers supra note 14, at 188. Though this conclusion is couched in a
discussion of how policymakers should approach leave policy, the underlying idea that
successful leave policy need not, and indeed, should not, challenge men to change their
perceptions and practices regarding parental leave reveals a sexist adherence to and
unwillingness to question existing gender norms.
52. See WILLIAMS, supra note 15 (explaining the various non-economic forces which
influence parents' decisions regarding leave and help to maintain the gender inequality
within the system); Bornstein, supra note 12, at 95-98 (noting the persistence of gender
inequality is due, in part, to current workplace norms which are falsely based on the model
of a fully committed worker with no familial obligations); see also Angie K. Young,
Assessing the Family and Medical Leave Act in Terms of Gender Equality, Work/Family
Balance, and the Needs of Children, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 121-124 (1998) (noting
that prevalent norm-changing is the long-term solution to increasing the number of men who
take paternity leave).
53. In Sweden, parents enjoy 90% wage replacement for the first sixty days after the
birth of their child, and 80% wage replacement for the following 300 days. Grill, supra note
34, at 378-379.
54. Selmi, supra note 5, at 772 (noting that, as of the late 1980s, "approximately 44%
of Swedish men take parental leave with the average leave [period] lasting forty-five
days."). See also Grill, supra note 34, at 377-378 (noting that in Sweden each parent has
thirty days of mandatory leave); Linda Haas, Nurturing Fathers and Working Mothers:
Changing Gender Roles in Sweden, in MEN, WORK, AND FAMILY, supra note 28, at 248-249
[hereinafter Haas, Nurturing] (demonstrating Swedish fathers' participation in specific child
care tasks).
55. HAAS, PARENTHOOD supra note 50, at 81.
56. Though his figures are ten years old, Professor Selmi claims that just 2 to 3.6% of
employees at private-sector worksites took leave under the FMLA, and that only 41.8% of
this approximately 3% were men. Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395, 408 (1999) (citing the Commission on Family and
Medical Leave, A Workable Balance: Report to Congress on Family and Medical Leave
Practices at 58-61 (1997)). Further, Selmi points to indications that the majority of men
who did in fact take leave under the FMLA were most likely taking personal sick leave
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experience a distinct division from men in terms of employment
opportunities and salary levels that is worse than the division felt by
working women in the United States.57 This division persists in part
because Swedish employers know women will take parental leave more
often and for much longer duration than men (less than 10% of Swedish
fathers share leave equally with their partners).58
Not only has the
workplace gender gap not improved, but in some cases dissatisfaction with
gender-neutral family policy serves as a cover for explicit acts of sex
discrimination. 59
One of the biggest problems with the Swedish system is that parents
do not have individual leave allocations, but rather share a total amount of
available leave between them, and Swedish mothers almost universally
breastfeed for at least six months.6 ° Consequently, mothers are almost
always the leave-takers for the early months of a child's life, with fathers
taking leave during the child's later infancy to provide a brief respite to the
mothers. 61 Thus, this system actually functions to deepen the traditional
gender-based division of labor.62
Even if leave were available for
simultaneous use, there is no indication that a larger percentage of fathers
would take advantage of it. That only about half of all fathers even relieve
their partners over the entirety of an infant's first year despite nearly full
64
6
wage replacement, ' a program which has been in place since 1974,
strongly suggests that wage replacement alone is an insufficient incentive
to equalize leave-taking behavior.

rather than parental leave. Id. A survey from 2000 indicates that 13.5% of eligible men
take leave. Chuck Halverson, Notes, From Here to Paternity: Why Men Are Not Taking
Leave Under The Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 257, 259 (2003)
(citing FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000 UPDATE, supra note 10).
57. According to Professor Nancy Dowd, "fj]ob segregation by sex is even stronger in
Sweden than it is in the United States, both between and within occupations. Women are
concentrated in fewer jobs, have penetrated male-dominated occupations to a lesser degree,
and rarely advance to the middle or upper levels of job hierarchies .... " Nancy E. Dowd,
Envisioning Work and Family: A CriticalPerspective on InternationalModels, 26 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 311, 326 (1989). See also HAAS, PARENTHOOD supra note 50, at 35-38 (claiming
that Sweden's labor market is highly sex segregated).
58. HAAS, PARENTOOD supra note 50, at 81.
59. Id. at 327.
60. Pleck, Employer Policiessupra note 48, at 230.
61. Id. at 227, 230-31.
62. HAAS, PARENTHOOD supra note 50, at 82.
63. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (asserting that almost 50% of fathers took
some parental leave).
64. HAAS, PARENTHOOD supra note 50, at 41.
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The Statutory Basics: A PreliminarySketch of CompensatoryLeave
Legislation

In order to work meaningfully toward gender equalization in the
workplace, leave legislation, if not mandated, must create incentives for
men to take leave. Full or partial wage replacement might make paternity
leave an option, but it does nothing in and of itself to encourage leave.65
Suggestions and efforts abroad have created a public paternity leave
campaign, 66 and Selmi makes a promising proposal to persuade certain
groups of employers to encourage paternity leave, 67 but not enough
attention has been paid to creating substantive incentives targeting male
employees. Without material encouragement, men will not progress
beyond Pleck's uninspiring vision of paternity leave, and maternity leave
will remain the norm.
To this end, I propose legislation which
compensates male and female leave-takers above and beyond full wage
replacement. If men are actually paid to take leave, it is likely that they
will finally take it in large numbers, thus effecting normative change. For
simplicity's sake, I will refer to both a leave system that authorizes
payment above and beyond full wage replacement and the payments under
such a system as compensatory leave. The following legislative proposals
are geared toward increasing male participation in leave-taking, as well as
improving leave policy for all parents.
1.

Expanding the Set of Eligible Workers

The group of employers, and hence, employees, affected by the
FMLA 61 is much too small. The group of affected employers should be
expanded to be as large as is politically and economically feasible. 69 I will
address the issue of costs separately, but perceived economic hardship to
very small companies (for example employers with ten or fewer
65. See supra Part I.
66. See, e.g., Haas, Nurturing supra note 54, at 248 (in Sweden, "[c]ampaigns were
launched to convince fathers that taking leave was the right thing to do.").
67. See Selmi, supra note 5, at 775-781 (advocating a "set-aside program for family
leave"). Selmi's set aside program would require the government to mandate that for
employers to qualify for government contracts, a certain threshold of workers of each
gender must utilize a certain amount of parental leave. So long as the government contract
is more lucrative than encouraging paternity leave is costly, employers that are eligible for
government contracts would have an economic incentive to encourage paternity leave.
68. The FMLA mandates leave only to employers with fifty or more employees. 29
U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(1999).
69. In her published note, Erin Gielow suggests that lowering the threshold from fifty
employees to twenty-five will be both effective and feasible. Erin Gielow, Note, Equality in
the Workplace: Why Family Leave Does Not Work, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1529, 1538-41
(2002).
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employees) may make it difficult to legislate for companies below a given
threshold.7 ° The key is to establish a legal right to leave among a
substantial enough majority of workers that over time it becomes an
expectation for most prospective employees in most industries.
Consequently, employers that are too small to be legally required to
provide leave will be motivated by market forces to provide leave to highly
skilled workers, as those workers would expect leave if employed by larger
companies.
2.

Offering Leave to Dual-Income Households

There are two means, through gender-neutral legislation,7' of offering
compensatory leave to dual-income households to encourage male leavetaking. One option would be for parental leave and compensation to be
tied to each individual parent. Under this system, a mother and father
would each receive an equal amount of compensatory leave to be used at
their discretion. If one parent ran out of leave, the other's available leave
would remain unaffected. To encourage equal co-parenting, parents would
be able to take compensatory leave concurrently.72 Depending on the
amount of compensatory leave policymakers deem adequate to stimulate
male leave-taking, it might be possible to add on a period of mere wage
replacement or even unpaid leave after parents exhaust their allocation of
compensatory leave.
Though this first option would likely be a sufficient incentive for more
men to take leave, it is less than ideal. If compensatory leave added a
percentage of a parent's income to their base salary, it would still be biased
on average toward maternity leave, due to salary differences between men
and women.73 If compensation were set at a fixed amount over base salary,

70. See WISENSALE, supra note 9, at 143, 148-51 (documenting the business
community's initial reaction to the FMLA).
71. Partially due to constitutional concerns, see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying
text (describing the possible constitutional pitfalls of mandatory leave legislation, whether
gender-neutral on its face or not, and of gender-based legislation generally), and partially
due to increased political ease, equitable concerns, and personal preference, this article
advocates a gender-neutral compensatory leave regime as opposed to one that explicitly
treats men and women differently.
72. This is in contradistinction to the Swedish model, where, after the first ten days of
an infant's life, parents cannot take leave concurrently. Grill, supra note 34, at 377 (citing
The Act to Amend the Public InsuranceAct of 1962, No. 908, ch. 3, § 13, ILO Leg. Series,
Swed. V (1973). It is also in contradistinction to the leave system advocated by Professor
Selmi. See Selmi, supra note 5, at 771 ("[L]eave would belong exclusively to one parent
without the possibility of sharing the leave between parents.").
73. See Bomstein, supra note 12, at 116 ("[P]arental leave is likely to be used primarily
by women due to their position in the workforce as compared to that of men.").
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its success as an incentive would vary widely according to income level,74
and it would perhaps be more susceptible to budget cuts over time. Also,
this first option might result in a system like Sweden's, where even if a
larger percentage of men take leave and for longer periods of time, women
will inevitably take leave first and thus reinforce traditional gender roles
within the household. 75 A directive that tried to force parents to take leave
for a significant portion of a child's early infanthood would be
indistinguishable from leave-mandating, and therefore undesirable if too
Though gender role preservation would perhaps be an
lengthy.76
acceptable byproduct in the face of women's employment gains, there
exists a second approach to incentivizing paternal participation which does
not yield such unwelcome side-effects.
Under this second approach, parents would be evaluated as a couple,
and rewarded with a compensatory bonus only if both parents took leave.
Desired leave arrangements (both parents maintaining an equal percentage
of leave-taking over the first three months after birth, for example)
encouraged through a system of bonuses would not take on a distasteful
mandatory character. 77 Rather, parents could consider all of the pros and
cons before deciding whether and how to take leave. 7' Depending on what
leave arrangements appear most desirable to policymakers (that is, those
that are deemed most likely to yield the greatest gains in achieving genderequalization in leave-taking and more broadly in the workforce overall),
different degrees of monetary incentives could be designed accordingly.
Upon initial consideration, a leave arrangement that encourages equal
parental participation in early infancy, such as the parenthetical example
above, seems particularly important for promoting sustained79 equal
parenting and thus particularly effective in changing gender normS.

74. Not only would success vary, but it might be difficult to arrive at an acceptable

figure. A high figure might come at too great a cost to employers of low-skilled and
otherwise inexpensive workers. A low figure would threaten rendering compensatory leave
merely symbolic, particularly as one ascends the salary ladder.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62 (highlighting the disincentives associated
with Swedish paternity leave and one of their likely consequences).
76. See supra Section II.A.2 (concluding that a mandatory leave system would only be
viable if the mandated leave period were of short duration).
77. See supra text accompanying note 76 (describing an approach that would force a
parent to take leave).
78. Incentives of course would mostly be statutorily imposed in the form of additional
compensation, but would also include personal benefits such as increased family time.
Disincentives are largely socially imposed, and would hopefully lessen as a compensatory
leave system gained traction, but might include economic considerations such as potential
harm to one's employment track.
79. See Malin, Fathers supra note 6, at 1057-1059 (discussing the correlation between
paternal use of leave and paternal involvement in child care).
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Offering Leave to Single-Income, Dual-Parent Households

For single-income, dual-parent families, policymakers will have to
determine whether or not offering compensatory leave is justified. On one
hand, because the single-earner in a dual-parent household will most likely
be the father, offering compensatory leave will almost surely increase the
percentage of men taking parental leave compared to the entire pool of
leave takers. Also, the availability of compensatory leave might actually
encourage the non-wage earner (often the mother) to enter the workforce,
as the wage-earning parent would be able to take over childcare
responsibilities without sacrificing any income, leaving the non-wage
earner free to add income to whatever the family could have earned absent
compensatory leave. Though this benefit is consistent with a wage
replacement regime, a compensatory leave regime that makes leave-taking
by the single-earner economically preferable to not taking leave would
result in many more non-wage earners suddenly available to test the job
market.
On the other hand, paid leave is less justified, and harder to sell
politically, when one parent already stays home to fulfill the caretaker role.
Also, in a political regime that discourages traditional single-wage earner
families as inefficient and socially undesirable, as one implementing a
compensatory leave program would likely be, rewarding families for
sticking to this model seems counterintuitive.
Finally, making
compensatory leave available exclusively to dual-income families among
dual-parent households might also encourage the non-wage earner in a
single-income family to enter the workforce so that the household could
avail itself of the extra compensation."0 In other words, the amount of extra
compensation for which a family could qualify would be tacked onto
whatever salary the non-wage earner could command on the market. In a
compensatory leave regime that requires both parents to take leave in order
to receive extra compensation, an exception to such a requirement might be
adopted in order to facilitate the introduction of non-wage earners into the
workforce.
The exception might allow for some amount of wage
replacement as opposed to extra compensation, however, since any wage
replacement that, combined with the non-wage earner's salary potential,
exceeds the initial wage earner's original salary would provide an

80. Note that childcare would still be covered, even assuming, as under the FMLA, that
the newly employed parent would not yet be eligible for leave, see 29 U.S.C. § 261 1(2)(A)
(1999) (imposing a requirement that an employee requesting leave must be employed for at
least twelve months prior to the request), since the previously single-earner parent would
now be eligible for leave. An added benefit of a waiting period prior to leave-eligibility for
new employees in this context would thus be that the father, as the likely initial wage earner,
would be the only parent available to take leave.
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economic incentive for a non-wage earner parent to join the workforce
while the initial wage earner takes leave.
It is difficult to determine which approach to single-earner, dualparent households would be most advantageous. An answer would likely
depend on a specific inquiry into whether increasing the percentage of male
leave-takers is worth the price of subsidizing single-earner, dual-parent
families, and additionally into which approach would most effectively
increase labor force participation overall. As something of a political
compromise, policymakers may wish to consider providing partial or full
wage replacement to single-earners in lieu of additional compensation.
4.

Offering Leave to Single-Parent Households

For single-parent families, compensatory leave should be available as
though the wage earner were taking advantage of the greatest level of
bonuses available to dual-parent families. It is important to provide equal
benefits regardless of family status for the sake of children, who cannot
control the familial situation in which they find themselves.8 1 Furthermore,
the level of benefits available to single parents, who are largely women,
should have little effect on the desirability of extra compensation for
married fathers-the main targets of compensatory leave.82
Though this proposal might be criticized as encouraging single-parent
families, it provides no extra incentive to become a single parent: the
income available to a single parent household will still necessarily be less
than the income available to a dual-parent household. Rather, this tactic
merely acknowledges the reality of the growing number of single-parent
households and seeks to ensure that these families are not punished as such.
Also, because single parents often have no other income to depend on, to
deny them compensatory leave would be to deny it to those who need it
most.83 While it might be possible to encourage marriage by making
compensatory leave exclusively available to dual-parent households, it is

81.

For a "sake of the children" argument, see, e.g., Young, supra note 52, at 132-133

(urging the need to provide single parents universal access to parental leave and affordable
childcare); Dowd, supra note 39, at 354 ("We should not punish children for the families
into which they are born."). See generally ANNE L. ALSToTr, No EXIT: WHAT PARENTS
OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS (2004) (discussing parents'
obligations to their children and the economic and social effects of raising children on the
lives of parents).
82. There might be some effect, however, to the extent that the benefits available to
single parents take away from the overall funding for compensatory leave and thus reduce
all leave-takers' individual distribution of compensation.
83. See Dowd, supra note 39, at 353 ("The differential in income between dual-parent
and single-parent families does suggest that family-leave policy should incorporate
supplemental benefits for single-parent families.").
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unclear that this goal is desirable. Regardless, pursuing exclusivity in this
context exacts too great of a penalty on single-parent families, making promarriage policymaking an improper project for this forum.
5.

How Much Is Enough: Deciding on Compensation Levels

We need not establish the exact percentage of compensation above
normal wages that should be provided under a compensatory leave regime,
but it must be sufficiently large to be enticing while not too large to make it
unreasonably costly. Also, the percentage should decrease as income
increases, with a cap for very high incomes. 84 However, although adjusting
compensation percentages according to an income scale is necessary in
order to provide equity across income levels and to avoid obscenely high
costs, it should not be overemphasized. Encouraging leave-taking among
high-salaried and high powered employees becomes important because it
serves as a means to mitigate discrimination based on familial status that
might occur as a result of this proposal.
If leave-taking becomes
economical for high-level employees, norms will change more rapidly, and
upper levels of management will be less likely to discriminate against
workers who might be a threat to take leave.85 Though just because upperlevel workers may want to take advantage of leave does not mean they will
encourage lower-level workers to do so, over time corporate culture will be
more susceptible to change if that change is also present at the executive
level. 6

One might think it is purely beneficial for workers to receive generous
84. Under the FMLA, "highly compensated employees" (defined as the highest-paid ten
percent of all employees) are exempted from leave eligibility. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(2)
(1993). Though the exception probably originated as a cost compromise, it sets exactly the
wrong tone in attempting to alter corporate culture to be receptive to paternity leave. See
Heather A. Peterson, Note, The Daddy Track: Locating the Male Employee Within the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 253, 270 (2004) (arguing that the
FMLA's "highly compensated employee" exception contributes to "a gendered division of
labor in the household .... ).
85. See BLAU & FERBER, supra note 4, at 244-251 (discussing the theory of "tastes for
discrimination," where, if employers or high-ranking employees have discriminatory
attitudes toward a particularly group, discrimination against that group will likely occur,
often in the form of wage differences paid in order to induce the preferred group of
employees to work with the less preferred group). "Tastes for discrimination" theory
applies in this context because according to the theory wage discrimination is less likely to
result among similarly situated employees. Therefore, if upper-level employees are taking
leave along with lower-level employees, less enmity between the groups will result in less
discrimination.
86. Id. See also Bomstein, supra note 12, at 118-119 ("As long as these highest
ranking employees do not take leave, there is an unspoken message that the top officials
neither sanction nor embrace such behavior.").

2007]

AGGRESSIVE PARENTAL LEAVE INCENTIVIZING

leave packages, but some argue that if leave packages are too generous they
will be disadvantageous to workers, especially women.87 If employers bear
a significant amount of the cost for paid leave, it is likely that at least some
of that cost will be deferred by offering lower wages.8" To the extent that
women continue to take parental leave more regularly than men, women,
among them the vast majority of single parents, will be more likely to
suffer wage cuts than their male counterparts. One might question whether
a more equalized and generous parental leave system is worth a serious cut
to wages. We should be particularly concerned about wages of low-income
workers; the lower one's hourly wage, the less likely it becomes that a
percentage of that wage, over the short time one qualifies for compensatory
leave, will make up for the wage cuts that employers are forced to make.89
Therefore, while we must be mindful that compensation levels are not
set so high that they will have an unacceptably dramatic effect on wages,
and particularly on women's wages, the best way to address these concerns
is through funding mechanisms that defer the costs of implementing
compensatory leave away from employers. 90 After that, compensation
levels should be determined based on economic reasonableness and
political viability. A preliminary suggestion would set compensation above
full wage replacement ranging from 25% of salary for a household under
the poverty line to 5% for the ninetieth percentile and above. As a
compensatory leave regime begins to affect underlying gender norms
concerning leave-taking, the compensation percentages can be reevaluated
and perhaps lowered.
6.

Setting Time Limits: Deciding on Leave Duration

As with excessive levels of compensation, it has also been argued that
overly extensive leave may hurt women workers. According to Professor
Gillian Lester, "[1]eave[] of very lengthy duration might lead to a loss of
work experience and depreciation of human capital." 9' Professor Lester

87. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 5, at 41 (claiming that generous paid leave policies
increase the likelihood that women will take leave and may contribute to the perpetuation of
negative attitudes about working mothers).
88. Id. at 60.
89. This assertion assumes that employers will bear the brunt of the costs of a
compensatory leave system. Though, arguably, employers will always experience some
cost, they need not necessarily bear the brunt of those costs. To the extent that a leave
system is funded through alternate mechanisms, wage-reduction, and the associated limits to
the level of extra compensation that can be offered, becomes less of a concern. See infra
Part III.
90. See supra note 89.
91. Lester, supra note 5, at 41 (citing Christopher J.Ruhm, Economic Consequences of
ParentalLeave Mandates: Lessons from Europe, 113 Q.J. ECON. 285, 314-315 (1998)).
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cites a study indicating that increases in paid leave duration result in an
increased amount of leave taken, at least up to a point.92 Not only is this
logical for the wage replacement systems studied, but a compensatory leave
system would actually provide a disincentive to go back to work for the
duration of the period of compensatory leave. We must remember that any
economically rational employee, and certainly any single-parent wage
earner, will likely use the full extent of compensatory leave that they are
provided. Paying parents not to work carries with it a serious danger that
parents will be marginalized in the workplace. 93 The risk and extent of
marginalization increases as the cost to employers rises, which implicates
both compensation levels and leave duration.94
If a compensatory leave system does not succeed in equalizing leavetaking by gender, women will be made particularly vulnerable to
marginalization. Lester finds evidence supporting this unwelcome result in
a study indicating that countries with extremely generous parental leave
policies (in terms of both wage replacement and time off) "tended to have
the most 'traditional' attitudes about working mothers." 95 Even if a
compensatory leave system does eventually equalize leave-taking among
dual-parent families, marginalization based on familial status will likely
continue to affect women more
than men due to the large number of single
96
mothers who will be affected.
The duration of compensatory leave is in some ways a more difficult
issue than that of setting compensation levels due to differences of opinion
among experts about how much leave will best achieve parent/child
bonding while also acknowledging economic exigencies. As previously
mentioned, over-extended leave-taking will hurt worker "attachment" to
the workforce, which will have an overall negative impact on women's

92. Id. (citing Jutta M. Joesch, Paid Leave and the Timing of Women's Employment
Before and After Birth, 59 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1008, 1017 (1997)).
93. Concerns about "mommy track" or "parent track" employment will only increase as
those employment paths become more traveled. On the other hand, once norms change
enough to create a substantial number of "parent track" employees, the distinction as a
means of discrimination may lose its footing.
94. Again, cost distribution might work toward minimizing the risk of marginalization
generated by employers. See supra note 89. Note, however, that it may be more difficult to
defer costs from extensive leave duration because this cost is manifested not just in terms of
compensation that must be paid, but in terms of a productivity loss for employers. See infra
Part IIl.
95. Lester, supra note 5, at 41 (citing James W. Albrecht et al., A Cross-Country
Comparison of Attitudes Toward Mothers Working and Their Actual Labor Market
Experience, 1 LABOUR 591, 597-98 (2000)).
96. See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 39, at 342 (noting that women are the heads of most
single-parent families); Bornstein, supra note 12, at 113-114 (discussing the economic
infeasibility of taking leave as a single parent).
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economic success. 97 At the same time, too little leave time will negatively
impact work/family balance. A world in which the average worker does
not have access to an adequately long leave period will be a world where
women can only achieve economic success by embracing a male worker
ideal. 98 As long as women are having children and men are not claiming
primary responsibility for them, a male worker model will never be equally
occupied by female workers and gender equality in the workplace will
remain elusive. 99

Parental leave totaling no more than six months per parent (more for a
single parent, but perhaps not twice as much for fear of worker detachment
and because of anticipation that couples will use some parental leave
concurrently) should maintain the balance between family time and
Perhaps as gender
women's positive economic development.l 00
equalization among leave takers advances, the period of leave offered will
rise; presently, the threat of discrimination faced by female workers makes
any longer period of leave infeasible.
7.

The Case Against "Use-It-or-Lose-It" Incentivizing

Leave systems attempting to incentivize paternity leave without extra
compensation exist in some European countries and have also been
° Known as either "use-it-or-lose-it' 0 2
advocated by American scholars.
leave or "capitation,"' 03 this system requires that both parents take a certain
amount of paid leave or face losing their right to the amount of wage
replacement granted within the given leave system.' 4 Thus, as under a
compensatory leave regime, men have a financial incentive to take however
much leave is required in order for paid benefits to kick in. The chief
97. Lester, supra note 5, at 38.
98. See WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 64-65 (discussing women's relationship to the
"ideal-worker" norm).
99. Id.; Bornstein, supra note 12, at 98.
100. Though three months of parental leave would be sufficient "to establish a
foundation for the parent-child relationship," a minimum of six months is desirable. Dowd,
supra note 39, at 348. See also Yale Bush Advisory Center, supra note 35, at 345
(recommending benefits for a minimum of six months).
101. The most prominent example of a pure "use-it-or-lose-it" policy is in place in
Norway, where "four weeks [of paid parental leave] must be taken by the father or that time
is lost to the family as a whole." Kathryn Kroggel, Comment, Absent Fathers: National
Paid Paternity Leave for the United States-Examination of Foreign and State-Oriented

Models, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 439, 461 (2004). Professor Selmi is the most prominent
American scholar who has argued for a "use-it-or-lose-it" system expressly as a means of
incentivizing leave-taking among male employees. Selmi, supra note 5, at 771.
102. Lester, supra note 5, at 80-81.

103. See Dowd, supra note 39, at 347, 349-350 (referring to a system that requires men
to take a certain amount of leave to qualify for wage replacement as capitation).
104. Lester, supra note 5, at 80-8 1.
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argument favoring a "use-it-or-lose-it" leave regime over a compensatory
one is that it will save on costs. Not only will society not be responsible for
providing compensation beyond full wage replacement, but it will actually
save money to the extent that men do not utilize the program.
Negative incentives, however, are not as successful motivators-and
therefore not as desirable-as positive ones. For example, if a family loses
the benefit of wage replacement leave in a "use-it-or-lose-it" regime, it will
likely lose this benefit because a parent has continued working; any loss of
benefits will be offset by the continued working of the offending parent,
and therefore losses are minimized. In fact, in a capitation system with less
than full wage replacement, there is a financial incentive for the primary
wage earner to return to work despite the prospect of losing leave benefits.
If a father has no intention of taking the necessary amount of parental leave
to trigger paid leave, he may be able to take leave as vacation time and
subsequently return to full employment. °5 The threat of losing paid leave
can often be mitigated; however, this is to the detriment of mothers, who
often will be forced to stay home alone while their husbands return to their
more lucrative employment.
Additionally, under a capitation system with less than full wage
replacement, many couples will not be able to afford to have both parents
take the required period of parental leave. Thus, a capitation system may
unfairly penalize poorer households for whom partial wage replacement is
not an adequate safeguard to enable them to take a sustained leave from
work. Under a compensatory leave system, all households, regardless of
income, will enjoy the opportunity for both parents to take meaningful
parental leave.
8. Conclusion
Despite potential dangers, most significantly the risk of gender-based
discrimination in hiring and a negative impact on women's wages, a
compensatory leave system that aggressively incentivizes male
participation in leave-taking is well worth the risk. Even Professor Lester
acknowledges that simply increasing male participation in leave-taking will
obviate the risks for and lessen the impact on working women. 10 6 Over
time, the creation of norms for both maternity and paternity leave will
make the potential marginalization of workers with children less of an
issue. However, it is critically important that the duration of compensatory
leave, possibly in combination with wage replacement and unpaid leave, be
carefully calibrated to minimize the negative social and economic effects
105. See, e.g., Pleck, Employer Policies supra note 48, at 228 (regarding the use of
'informal' paternity leave).
106. Lester, supra note 5, at 79.
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on working women.
IIl.

FUNDING: POSSIBILITIES AND DEFENSES

Among the political oppositions to a compensatory paid leave

program, undoubtedly the strongest and most vocal criticism will be that
someone must finance the program. The economic costs of a paid leave
program manifest themselves in two ways. First, there are concerns
regarding funding compensatory leave. The cost is, of course, increased
the more leave is incentivized. These costs will be particularly exacerbated
when those incentives take the form of additional compensation above and
beyond wage replacement, as I advocate. 10 7 Pragmatically, the very idea
behind incentivization is to increase leave-taking, which will multiply costs
as more people take leave; the more successful a leave program is, the
more expensive it will be.' °8 It follows that the more aggressive leave
incentivization proposals are, the more difficult it will be to convince
legislators and their constituents to support them.
Second, employers-and hence the economy at large-will suffer
production loss and various extra administrative costs for each worker who
takes leave.' 0 9 This cost is more acute for an aggressively incentivized
leave proposal as employees on leave will not feel the same economic
strain that they would under a non-paid leave regime, and presumably will
not return to work as quickly."0 This will nearly universally be the case if
employees are actually paid more if they stay away from work than if they
return. Experts who advocate a high percentage of wage replacement, but
an amount which falls short of one hundred percent replacement, may do so
because they want to retain financial pressure on employees to return to
work, and hence cut down on costs. "'l
The following section will present funding options and identify
potential benefits and shortcomings of such methods.
Using this
information, the section will then establish a desirable funding scheme.
Finally, I will also attempt to combat criticisms alleging inevitably
exorbitant costs for a compensatory leave proposal.
107. See WISENSALE, supra note 9, at 201 (discussing how paid leave will increase the
number of participating workers).
108. Id.
109. Lester, supra note 5, at 5 1.
110. See Lester, supra note 5, at 60-61 (noting this phenomenon for a wage replacement
system as opposed to unpaid leave).
111. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 35, at 464 (advocating wage
replacement at 75% of regular income); Yale Bush Advisory Center, supra note 35, at 34445 (advocating wage replacement at 75% of regular income). See also Grill, supra note 34,
at 378-379 (indicating that Sweden's wage replacement is 90% for the first sixty days after
the birth of a child and 80% for the following 300 days).
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Methods of Funding
1.

Charging Employees

One obvious way to fund paid leave is to charge workers. Proposals
vary from applying a payroll tax that will take a cut from all wage
earners 112 to creating programs that will target funds specifically from
workers likely to take leave. Proposals of the second sort include
mandating that employees create personal leave accounts from which they
can draw only on special occasions, which would include parental leave." 3
However, self-funded leave can only account for partial costs in a
legislative scheme that contemplates monetary rewards for leave-taking,
because any compensation that is above wage level would have to come
from a source other than the employee's fund. Therefore, this section will
focus on a payroll tax that would apply to all workers.
A payroll tax can be applied toward funding either an account
dedicated to insuring against leave or paying it directly, or an insurance
system already in place at the state level. 14 The two most commonly
utilized programs are state unemployment insurance and state disability
insurance." 5 While there has been much debate over the merits of both
systems, neither is preferable to establishing a program dedicated to
funding parental leave exclusively.116

112. This system would be similar to social security withdrawals, and has operated
successfully in other countries with strong leave programs, most notably Sweden. See Grill,
supra note 34, at 380 (describing sources of funding for paid parental leave in Sweden); see
also Arline Friscia, The Worker-FundedLeave Act: The Time Is Now to Help Build Stronger
Families with a More Stable Economy, 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 73, 73-90 (2001)
(discussing a payroll tax proposal in New Jersey).
113. See Lester, supra note 5, at 53 (describing a paid leave system financed from
employee payments which may be drawn upon in situations of work interruption).
114. There has already been experimentation with the notion of partial wage replacement
using extant insurance programs. See supra text accompanying note 36 (recalling President
Clinton's proposal to use Temporary Disability Insurance Funds to finance partial wage
replacement).
115. For a comprehensive discussion of both types of insurance programs in the context
of parental leave, see Katherine Elizabeth Ulrich, Insuring Family Risks: Suggestions For a
National Family Policy and Wage Replacement, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 29-53 (2002)
(examining proposals to expand unemployment and disability insurance to include partial
wage replacement for parental leave); Natalie Koss, The California Family Temporary
Disability InsuranceProgram, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1079, 1079-88 (2003)
(discussing Califomia's disability insurance program).
116. See, Rachel Amow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Future of
Work/Family Initiatives in a "Me, Inc." World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 345, 408 (2003)
("Although a paid leave program should have its own funds, it could be modeled on or even
take advantage of the administrative infrastructure for existing programs.
) (emphasis
added).
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Not only is it symbolically important for a tax system to acknowledge
the importance of funding leave, but groups both sympathetic and
unsympathetic to parental leave have pointed to potential economic
problems stemming from a reliance on a pre-established funding program.
Business groups argue that raiding other funds is undesirable because it
will threaten the economic security of those to whom those funds are
rightly intended." 7 Though one can debate whether others' benefits will
truly be in jeopardy, funding leave-takers through finances intended for the
unemployed (which leave-takers by statute are not)1 18 or the disabled or
temporarily disabled (which may include post-partum mothers, but not
fathers) seems inappropriate. On the other side, paid leave advocates have
noted that relying too heavily on funds from these other programs may
place at risk the continuing availability of funds for leave-takers." 9
Regardless of the manner of funding, we must consider whether it is
wise to derive either primary or partial funding for compensatory leave
from workers themselves. Of course, taxing workers will offset some of
the financial gain to be had from taking leave; however, because a tax will
be distributed among all employees, leave-taking employees will pay a
smaller percentage in taxes than they will receive through subsequent leave
compensation. If no leave tax is charged, costs of a paid leave system
might be internalized by workers in other ways, such as through wage cuts,
hiring freezes, or reductions in other benefits. 120 In addition, compensatory
leave might be more politically viable if funding is partially paid for by
workers as opposed to employers (traditionally a politically powerful
group) or the general public fisc.
Furthermore, providing compensation so .that parents can afford to
take leave is only part of the motivation behind compensatory leave.
Primarily, compensatory leave is intended to provide an incentive for men
to take leave in order to further gender equality in the workplace. Thus,
some cost to employees in order to implement the program need not overly
concern us unless it diminishes the incentives for male employees to take
leave. It is unclear how allowing employee-based funding could lessen the

117. See Ulrich, supra note 115, at 40 (acknowledging that the unemployed have
different needs than parental leave-takers, such as obtaining future employment or training).
118. Arnow-Richman, supra note 116, at 405.
119. See id., at 404 (describing failed attempts to use unemployment insurance for
funding leave during the economic downturn following the boom of the late '90s).
120. See Christopher J. Ruhm & Jackqueline L. Teague, Parental Leave Policies in
Europe and North America, in GENDER & FAMILY ISSUES, supra note 45, at 137 (posing the
argument that benefits could raise costs of employment and force employers to cut costs in
ways harmful to employees). But see Marianne A. Ferber, Commentary on Chapter 5, in
GENDER & FAMILY ISSUES, supra note 45, at 164 (noting that costs to employers often
manifest themselves in higher prices rather than lower employee wages, so the cost to
employees, though they are also consumers, may be much more diffuse).
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incentives for men to take leave. Even so, it may be disingenuous to
advertise a leave program as beneficial to workers and then force those
same workers to pay for it.
2.

Charging Employers

An alternate funding mechanism requires employers to fund leave.
Individual employers could continue paying their employees while on
leave12 ' (and perhaps even at a premium) or employers could pay a tax
similar to a payroll tax in order to fund leave-taking. 1 2 The second, more
desirable, option would diffuse costs among the entire population of
employers rather than give the responsibility to individual employers on an
ad hoc basis. This would make it easier to incorporate small businesses
and vulnerable industries into a paid-leave system.12' Though an employer
tax may well trickle down to employees or consumers in the form of lower
that employers would have to
wages and/or higher prices, 124 some argue
1 25
internalize at least a portion of a leave tax.
To the extent that employers may have to internalize some of the costs
of funding leave, one may wish to tax employers in order for employees to
receive the most value from paid leave. However, even among scholars
who support some form of paid leave, there are some who oppose
The most compelling argument against
employer-funded leave.' 26
employer funding is that as long as women remain more likely than men to
take leave, female employees will be disproportionately expensive to
employ and therefore employers will be more likely to discriminate against
women in their hiring practices. 127 Although a compensatory leave regime
will hopefully alter the balance between male and female leave-taking, this
concern remains a valid one.

121. See Young, supra note 52, at 155-158 (examining the arguments both for and
against implementation of a leave system funded solely by employers).
122. For a particularly clear and concise proposal, see Peterson, supra note 84, at 279.
123. See Marc Mory & Lia Pistilli, Note, The Failureof the Family and Medical Leave
Act: Alternate Proposalsfor Contemporary American Families, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 689, 695-696 (2001) (discussing the particular difficulties of small businesses in
incorporating parental leave programs).
124. See supra note 120 (explaining the ways in which employers' costs are sometimes
deflected).
125. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 5, at 60 (arguing that employers may have to internalize
some costs due to the risks of lowering morale among workers or becoming less appealing
to workers who stand to gain less from having access to a leave policy).
126. See Young, supra note 52, at 156 (citing Nadine Taub, From ParentalLeaves to
Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381, 401 (1984-1985)).
127. Id. Concerns about potential discrimination are neutralized somewhat, however, by
a universal employer tax as opposed to an ad hoc cost to individual employers.
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In addition, many members of the business community predictably
oppose employer funding, arguing that employers already bear substantial
costs related to parental leave, even if the leave is unpaid.'28 It is
reasonable to argue that employers, by accepting government-mandated
leave, are already doing enough, and that paid leave should be funded
through other avenues. Whether or not one agrees, it may be practically
much more difficult to get paid leave legislation through Congress (already
a possibly insurmountable challenge) if industry lobbyists perceive that
businesses will have to pay for most or all of it.
3.

Charging the Public

A final option would be to fund the program out of the federal
government's general tax coffers, thereby distributing the cost of
compensatory leave throughout society, not just through employers and/or
employees.'2 9 Among the benefits of this approach is the possibility that
reducing the cost to employers would lessen the risk of discrimination or
wage increases. Under this approach, employees would pay less for
compensatory leave benefits than they would through either a payroll tax or
wage or other benefit reduction. One weakness of this approach is the
potential difficulty of convincing the American public that compensatory
leave is a policy goal worthy of finite public tax dollars. Paid leave might
find enough political support to overcome these economic considerations if
it was promoted as a policy to safeguard the welfare of children. As such,
it would perhaps make more sense to fund a paid leave program through
the public than through employers and/or employees.
4.

Conclusion

Because there are positive and negative aspects to each funding
method, the best statutory approach will combine all of them. Since it is
the easiest political sell and the negative economic effects are not
especially significant, 30 some sort of wage tax should provide the largest
portion of funding. However, it is important for the public to commit tax
128. See Peter A. Susser, The Employer Perspective on Paid Leave and the FMLA, 15
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 169, 169-170, 192 (2004) (explaining employers' position that even

uncompensated leave holds peripheral costs for employers, such as the need for temporary
employees and furthermore, employers' fear that uncompensated leave is only a stepping
stone to a system requiring compensation). See generally WISENSALE, supra note 9, at 134184 (detailing the history of and the policies behind the formulation of the FMLA).
129. See, Lester, supra note 5, at 61-62 (discussing the merits and pitfalls of a tax based
leave system).
130. Because costs will trickle down to employees at least somewhat under any funding
scheme, and because incentivizing for male employees is not weakened.
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dollars to the project in order to ensure adequate funding and show societal
support for a paid leave program. Also, in light of the economic gains to be
had from compensatory leave,131 it makes sense to give employers some of
the responsibility to pay for it.
B.

Why the Costs Are Worth It: The Economic Argument for
CompensatoryLeave

Though I have noted that paid leave will come at the expense of
employers in terms of lost productivity and/or the costs associated with
replacing the worker's output for the leave period, economists have pointed
to numerous areas where paid leave will ultimately save employers money
and strengthen the economy overall. For one, workers may be more
productive if they can remain at their present employment, since they will
be able to continue to use skills they have gained that are specific to that
employment.'
Restated, workers will retain the human-capital they have
built at a particular job and retention of human capital is not only beneficial
for the worker but also productive for the economy overall.'33 Second,
allowing for leave reduces the risk of unemployment and encourages the
preservation of job tenure.134 Further, women will be more likely to remain
in the job force if leave is provided.'
Also, businesses will save by
reducing the need to expend turnover-related costs and reducing individual
employee absenteeism. 136 Economists Roberta Spalter-Roth and Heidi

Hartmann have even postulated that the average benefits of (unpaid)

131. See infra Section III.B.
132. See Ruhm & Teague, supra note 120, at 137 (citing Guy C. Dalto, A Structural
Approach to Women's Hometime and Experience-EarningsProfiles: Maternity Leave and
PublicPolicy, in POPULATION & POL'Y REV. 8(3) 247-266 (1989)).

133. See BLAU & FERBER, supra note 4, at 184-185 (explaining the theory behind human
capital investments); Lester, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing the relationship between
differences in human capital, efficiency, and family leave policy).
134. See Ruhm & Teague, supra note 120, at 137 (citing ROBERTA M. SPALTER-ROTH &
HEIDI'I. HARTMANN, UNNECESSARY LOSSES: COSTS TO AMERICANS OF THE LACK OF FAMILY

[hereinafter SPALTER-ROTH & HARTMANN, UNNECESSARY
Spalter-Roth & Heidi I. Hartmann, Science and Politics and
the "Dual Vision" of Feminist Policy Research: The Example of Family andMedical Leave,
in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE, supra note 35, at 41-65 [hereinafter Spalter-Roth &
Hartmann, Science and Politics] (weighing potential costs and benefits associated with
family leave).
135. See supra note 5 (finding that women who must leave the workforce due to
inadequate family leave systems are less likely to return than women whose absence is not
prolonged).
136. See SPALTER-ROTH & HARTMANN, UNNECESSARY LOSSES supra note 134, at 137
(claiming that parental leave benefits employers more than it costs them due to reduced
unemployment and the preservation of job tenure).
AND MEDICAL LEAVE (1990)
LOSSES]); see also Roberta M.
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parental leave will be "six times greater than the costs....
Despite these potential benefits, some have questioned why the market
does not provide leave of its own accord if the benefits will truly outweigh
the costs. 13 8 However, trenchant traditional gender norms and the stigma
that accompanies leave-taking may explain why employers have been wary
to provide leave and workers have been wary to ask for it, even if providing
leave would ultimately be economically beneficial. Also, providing leave
will create immediate and direct costs that may be easier to see than the
long-term and indirect benefit.
Paid leave, of course, will require additional expense above the
transactions costs to employers that providing leave will create.
Compensatory leave multiplies this additional expense, because not only
does compensation increase, but the likelihood that employees actually will
take leave also rises dramatically. However, these extra costs may be valid
social expenditures if they are paid by employees and by society-at-large.
The well-being of children is widely acknowledged to be economically in
the best interest of society at large.13 9 Also, providing compensatory leave
will likely lessen public welfare expenditures in a way that providing
unpaid leave does not because parents will no longer have to choose
between working and paying for expensive infant care and staying home
unemployed or on unpaid leave. In this sense, compensatory leave, along
with its other benefits, may be a more efficient and productive 140 way of
providing public welfare.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing considerations, I believe it is necessary and
feasible to provide leave compensation as a means of incentivizing male
participation in leave-taking. Leave proposals that merely attempt to make
it less unattractive for men to take leave or that provide only mild
137. Ruhm & Teague, supra note 120, at 137. See also Spalter-Roth & Hartmann,
Science and Politics supra note 134, at 61 (concluding based on their previous study that
"the costs of not having the [FMLA] far outweighed the costs to businesses of implementing
it.").
138. See Ruhm & Teague, supra note 120, at 137 (theorizing that a lack of widespread
voluntary arrangements shows benefits may not absolutely outweigh costs).
139. See Dowd, supra note 39, at 345 ("[I1t is apparent by all indicators that early
investment in children reaps long-term developmental and other benefits that inure both to
the individual and to society."); see also Lester, supra note 5, at 33 ("An argument for
financing a social program in a way that redistributes wealth is best supported with evidence
that the program will confer a benefit on society as a whole rather than just on those who
receive the specific program benefits."). See generally ALSTOTT, supra note 81.
140. It is more productive because parents will be able to retain and build human capital
and to continue to be productive members of society, rather than removing themselves from
the economy and relying on government handouts.
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incentives for employees and employers to encourage male leave will never
achieve the full potential of leave legislation to further gender equality in
the workplace, which should be the overriding goal of competent leave
legislation. The most apt critique of my proposal is that it is infeasible
given the current political landscape. However, it is necessary for scholars
and policymakers alike to think outside the box to craft legislative
proposals that actually effectuate positive normative changes. A public
campaign that highlights the affordability and irrefutable social benefits of
my proposal can go far to create public support, which in turn can affect the
political landscape.

